Irita Kise

4^th yr, political science

Russia - NATO - the Baltic states

Security situation after Cold War

The number of conflicts has not decreased after the end of the Cold War, on the contrary, it has increased from 35 armed conflicts per year during the Cold War till 60 per year during last 5 years. Europe is not an exception. If before this region was relatively stable and open armed confrontations were rare due to the established spheres of influence, now the situation has changed. There are more and more sources for potential conflict and outbreak of local wars. The suppression of conflicts ended with the end of the Cold War. Envy, suspicion, evil gathered in course of many centuries burst out. The whole international order had to be reconsidered taking in account new realities: breakdown of bipolar system, instability in Russia, transitional societies in Eastern Europe, not mentioning the rest of the world whose problems were temporarily overshadowed by developments on the old continent. No doubt that the developing world will cause headaches for the pillars of international society - Europe and United States. Of course, for us Europeans, the situation in our continent is of the greatest importance. I think that no one who has seen the ruthless civil war in former Yugoslavia is sure of perpetual peace in Europe. Therefore creation of working security structures is one of the most important tasks in post Cold War era. Europe has always had various internal cooperation links and many economic and political organizations. After the Second World war integration tendencies have been especially strong. Thus, Europe the end of the Cold War met armed with several political and military organizations. The most powerful of them - EU and NATO. The other part of Europe lost its organizations because the purpose of them ceased to exist and the members of them were not willing to continue cooperation. That left place for uncertainty which has remained until these days. Not surprisingly, Europe is eager to involve also former Warsaw block countries in common security structures. The question only is whether to look for new form of security organization or use the existing ones and adapt them to the new tasks. Another question is: what role will Russia play in Europe? Russia does not fit into European pattern regarding its huge territory and potential of power. Besides, half of the Russian territory is situated in Asia. But the main problem is worrying situation inside Russia. I am sure, no European state would object Russia’s involvement in security matters in any way if that superpower would be a stable and predictable democracy. Unfortunately, that is not the case and Europe must consider any possibility.

Identification of the problem: Baltic states - Russia - NATO

The aim of this essay is to identify positions of three actors of international arena: Baltic states, Russia and NATO. This triangle is now one of the key issues in international society. The relations between the three sides are as complicated as possible. They are determined not only by present post-Cold war strategic situation but complicated by historical events, feelings of morality and responsibility, national interests etc. Stereotypes and suspicion also play a great role there. Of course, the weakest piece of this triangle is the Baltic states. They are dominated by more powerful Russia and NATO which are more likely to take in account each other’s opinion than listen to small states which are without any means of influence in international society. We can console ourselves saying that on our side is public opinion. But we all know that it is not always enough for preserving independence. I suppose that Western democracies are afraid of Russia. And so are the Baltic states. Fear for own security is much stronger than some abstract feelings of compassion. Baltic states of the three are also in the worst situation. They depend on both NATO and Russian politics and must take in account relations of both with each other. In this essay I will look at NATO and its survival and enlargement plans, Russia and its foreign policy, especially policy towards NATO and Eastern Europe, and how it all influences Baltic states and their reaction to events.

NATO: new mission

Traditionally, alliances are formed because an “outside” power or coalition poses a potential threat. Traditionalists may then consider NATO obsolete since the Warsaw Pact has collapsed. This view is quite common in Europe and the most popular view on NATO’s future in Russia. But proponents of NATO’s survival argue that from the start alliance has been a multipurpose organization. How justified are these purposes now?

1) Defence. After disappearance of Warsaw Pact, the possibility of attack against Western Europe is improbable. A Russia in prolonged crisis is a potential threat only to its immediate neighbours and not to the NATO. Alliance’s thinking is nevertheless attached to the traditional defence objectives as if they remain its “core function”. Of course, some military capacity for collective defence remains necessary as long as the possibility of a residual Russian threat with conventional or nuclear weapons cannot be entirely discounted.

2) Germany and the Status Quo. NATO is linked to German problem: Germany must be accommodated and it has been successfully done within a NATO framework.

3) An internal peace system. The long cooperation has changed the nature of interstate relations among alliance members. Involvement of USA has played positive role in diminishing the impact of the old rivalries.

4) Promoting democracy. Democracies are essentially peaceful in their external behaviour, in particular toward other democracies. NATO’s goal has been to protect its member countries against totalitarian threats from inside as well as outside. (Kaiser,1996:129-131)

Besides these traditional goals NATO has adopted some dictated by present situation being the only military organization in Europe. The promoting of stability in Europe has been pointed out as the main goal of NATO in present situation. Some regard this function as sufficient for continued existence of alliance. In this case the organization must go through reforms. NATO has reduced the number of armed forces, USA has withdrawn part of its forces. The weakest side of reform relates to the structural and strategic transformation. The old type thinking is deep-rooted also in NATO staff.

One of the solutions of the justification problem is enlargement. Instead of considering whether an alliance created to wage the Cold War is relevant in the vastly altered setting of post-Cold War Europe, policymakers are debating whether NATO should enlarge its membership by incorporating some or all of the Central and East European nations. Early in 1994 U.S. Senate voted 94 to 3 to approve a resolution favouring the expansion of the alliance. Although that resolution was nonbinding, it had major symbolic value. (Carpenter, 1994:2) Realists strongly favour such position. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger argued that it might be more prudent to extend NATO security guarantees to eastern Europe to discourage any expansionist ideas that Russia may entrain in the future: “It is in fact ambiguity about dividing lines, not their existence, and ambivalence about Western reactions, not their certainty, that tempt militarists and nationalists.” (Quoted by Barner-Barry & Hody, 1995:326) The same kind of arguments can be heard from the countries of Eastern Europe, although they are not said loudly but overshadowed by more innocent statements like re-entering the Western Europe and Western culture. The principal obstacle to expansion has been the concern that Moscow might regard the move as a hostile act, which could damage the West’s relations with the newly democratic Russia. Proponents of enlargement were buoyed in August 1993 when Russian president Boris Yeltsin indicated that his government would not object if Poland or Czech Republic sought to join the alliance. The Russian government’s backtracking on the issue, however, dampened the enthusiasm for enlargement and confirmed the views of critics who warned that Yeltsin’s accommodating attitude was not shared by Russia’s political and military hierarchy. Both Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev have subsequently emphasized that the only version of NATO’s expansion that would be tolerable to Moscow is one that included Russia. Such perspective is favoured neither by West nor Eastern Europe. West thinks that then NATO’s security role would be deluted. East Europe sees then no way how NATO could guard it against new Russian expansionism. Theoretically Russia’s membership in NATO could be possible because of the new NATO orientation, but practically it is impossible. Russia will never be accepted as a full member until there remains unpredictability of the course of events in Russia and the evolution of its military and foreign policies. Returning to policies of imperial expansion and authoritarian government would simply revive the original functions of NATO as a mechanism for the geostrategic deterrence of a common enemy. By contrast, enhancement of democratic principles in Russia’s domestic and foreign policies would eventually eliminate the need for NATO.

Western interests are often seen in highly personalized terms as a struggle between reforming President Yeltsin and his opponents. Thus anything which could increase Yeltsin’s political problems tends to be seen as working against Western interests. Therefore NATO is not very eager to accept East European countries as the new members of the alliance. Baltic states is one of the first areas where West has been cautious not to become too directly involved. Baltic states are seen - though it is seldom put explicitly in official statements - as a possible area for Russian military intervention. Should Russia use military power against the Baltic states, it would mean a serious deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, but it is not conceivable that the West would intervene militarily in support of the Baltic states. Thus, NATO has not been willing to give them explicit security guarantees.

Now NATO has firmly committed itself to enlargement. It is unlikely to obtain it with open Russian approval. It must, therefore, approach the issue in a way that minimizes the damage to relations with Russia and relieves the negative implications of expansion for those states that cannot join with a first group that will probably include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. One way to mediate Russian stance was NACC which was established in November 1991. NACC includes the 16 NATO countries and all the former members of the Warsaw Pact - including all 15 former Soviet republics. The NACC is often dismissed as an unproductive discussion club and like the OSCE seen as having no ability to deal with the fundamental problems of security. Besides the formal NACC gatherings, a number of bilateral projects have been proposed and completed. Most of these projects are briefings and seminars. Few of the projects go to the core of security problems. No explicit security guarantees have been given, but it seems that many Western governments think that through less directly binding statements and practical cooperation - primarily outside the military field - security links will develop.

Another attempt to bring closer to each other Russia, East Europe and NATO was program “Partnership for Peace”. It allowed to reconcile three somewhat contradictory policy concerns:

1) It addressed the security interests of the states that fear a rekindling of Russian expansionism;

2) It allayed the anxieties of the former Soviet satellites without piquing Russia’s fear of being isolated;

3) It would help to define a new post - Cold War mission for NATO - a mission not requiring the identification of a new enemy but set to tackle major threats to European security: the possibility of a resurgent Russia; the potential outbreaks of ethnic conflict; the increase in political and economic instability associated with the political and economical transformation in East and Central Europe. (Barner-Barry & Hody, 1995:316)

On June 22, 1994, Russia reluctantly became the 21^st state to join PfP. It was the best way to avoid isolation and to forestall as long as possible the issue of expanding NATO. The issue for Russia is not so much whether a particular eastern European state joins NATO but rather that Russia neither be nor appear to be excluded from emerging security frameworks.

Russian national interests and foreign policy

Russia clearly has the potential to be a great power. It has the land, the natural resources, and the military. Currently, however, it lacks the economic ability to utilize its resources effectively, and its army is underfunded and demoralized. But considered against weakness of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is great power. The fact that many countries considered Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union from which it inherited broad diplomatic licence including the obligation to fulfil international agreements and continue international negotiations, the Soviet seat in the Security Council of the UN, contributed to a quickly renewal of Russia’s self-perception as great power. These great-power attributes formed Russian foreign policy that treats the rest of the world differently from the way it treats its neighbours. Russian analyst Dmitrii Furman has suggested that Russia is pursuing a dual foreign policy. Toward the industrialized world, it has a “dinner jacket” policy conducted by the rules of the current diplomatic game. Towards its neighbours, it has a “flak jacket” policy, conducting business on the basis of brute force. The main actors are the Ministry of Defence and the directors of the military-industrial complex. (Barner-Barry & Hody, 1995:323)

Russian policy towards Baltic states

Russian policy towards Baltic states has gone through changes since the breakdown of Soviet Union. During the first year Russia constantly declared that cooperation with the Baltic countries was a priority issue. In reality, however, Moscow looked beyond and above the “near abroad”, having neither a distinct Baltic policy nor an adequate notion about the situation in the Baltics. The phase of political cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states in 1990 - 1991 was culminated on August 20, 1991, when Yeltsin announced recognition of the independence of the Baltic republics. Later Russian foreign policy transformed from regional priorities to the priorities of global strategy. Relations between Russia and Baltic countries became steeply asymmetric: Russian behaviour was now aimed at the maximization of influence, while the behaviour of the Baltic states was aimed at the minimization of the treatment. (Zhyryari :75-79)

Russian great-power identity

Russia clearly perceives itself as a temporarily weak state which nevertheless is still a major power: the potential of Russia’s significance, in Moscow’s view, gives it leave to assume the role of a major power, one of the pillars of the contemporary world order. It is very likely that Russia could not create an absolutely new democratic peace-loving identity and therefore it had to revert to one of the old identities. A great deal of Russia’s hardened foreign policy can be explained by domestic developments which emphasise the strengthening of the military. Another part of the explanation lies in Russia’s perception of international situation and threats it causes. D.Furman describes Russian agitation as willingness to be “great” but also doubts if others perceive Russia as great power. (1995:6) This nervousness allows to compare Russia with behaviour of a little child who wants that adults pay greater attention to him and listen to what he wants. In order to get heard he can do rather stupid things. D.Furman asks why Russia could not be like China. That big country does not strive to be present in all meetings of importance, to offer its assistance in every conflict on earth. Russia’s behaviour is so contrasting to that of China.

Russian vision of European security

Lukin thinks that there is at least one positive effect of democratic transformations in Russia - the presence of a strong and friendly Russia will help Europeans avoid a “Germanized Europe” and keep moving toward a “Europeanized Germany”, an outcome better for all parties. (Lukin,1992:71) He argues that peace in Europe depends on Germany and Russia. Now built into the European civilization, rather than opposing it, that partnership can become Europe’s blessing instead of its curse. It can become a security pillar for the entire continent. All that, however, on the condition that Russia will be treated not as a parish or a stepchild but as a full-fledged member of the European family of states. (Lukin, 1992:72)

As there is no real chance that Russia would soon become member of “aristocratic clubs” of West it tries to achieve its goal in other ways - through building parallel security system in Europe. Russia wants to turn OSCE into a cornerstone of the “new European structure”. Russia has been one of the founders of the OSCE and that would increase its political weight much more than would the persistent quest for second-class membership of the first-class Western club. (Baranovsky, 1992:116) Russian government has sought to use the OSCE as a vehicle to protect human rights against ethnic discrimination and also to legitimate its own “peacekeeping” role in the near abroad. Russia wants to be a leader in this new security system and not subordinated to others. In this case is understandable Russia’s desire to include in OSCE NATO as policing force in Europe. Then NATO would be controlled also by Russia, not only USA. Unfortunately, Russia has failed to create security structures which would satisfy it and set free from fears of isolation.

Russia and NATO: difficult partnership

Manfred Worner, NATO secretary general, stated that he was “well aware that stability in Europe depends on cooperation between Russia and NATO”. (Quoted by Shearman, 1995:101) This cooperation is not an easy one. Positions of both sides are largely determined by psychological factors. Especially it refers to the public opinion in Russia.

Has the opinion about NATO changed in Russia since the end of the Cold War? Some observers argue that Russia just continues the trend of soviet politics toward NATO. If the Western world no longer is regarded in Russia as a threat NATO has retained its status as the enemy number one. Of course, there seems to be a contradiction because the same Western states which help Russia economically also are members in NATO and in one case they are regarded as partners in another case - they are enemies. That is related with problems of soviet legacy. NATO as organisation has deep roots in Russian life and represents evil in itself. I do not think that Russian people could name more than two states which are members in NATO, beside USA. But they all would say that NATO is bad and wants war. Speaking about individual countries people would be more kindly disposed. In their minds NATO and individual Western countries do not match. Therefore, in my opinion, it was a mistake to keep the same structure as in times of Cold war for tasks of new post-Cold war order. At least, the name should be changed. Now the existence of NATO reminds Russia of its loss in Cold War and arouses feelings of offence. Specially, when Russia is excluded from decision making in Europe’s security matters. No doubt, nationalists will skilfully use this argument in their propaganda.

Even Russian specialists are looking with mistrust on new old NATO, not speaking of common people. They recognise the new purpose of North Atlantic organisation - to deal with Yugoslavia-type situations but, on the other hand, abuse or misuse of this instrument may create a serious problem, if suitable new mechanisms are not created. I think that the most favourable mechanism for Russia would be Russia’s right to veto NATO’s decisions. Many Russian politicians have argued that Russia’s relationship with NATO should be determined by its status as nuclear power with a military might far greater than those of other countries. (Shearman, 1995:101) And Russia got that acknowledgement of its special status in its “Partnership for Peace” agreement. Interesting that both sides regarded that agreement with suspicion. Russian State Duma sought to prevent ratification of the agreement, condemning it as a betrayal of Russian national interests. In the West the were objections that the agreement provides Russia with an entry point for having some influence over the West’s basic security organization while retaining its own sphere of influence in the near abroad (the West having no representation, for example, in the CIS). Kozirev admits: It’s not psychologically easy to accept the need to consult Moscow on issues that have always been deemed within the prerogative of the West. (Kozirev, 1995:9) NATO expansion is one of the questions Russia would like to have influence on.

Russia on NATO expansion

Russia recognises that Eastern Europe’s membership in NATO does not constitute a threat to Russian security. However, there is very strong opposition to such development in Russia. The arguments against are more like counterquestions: but why should NATO expand? If East European countries want to rejoin Western civilisation why have they chosen just NATO which is a military and political alliance? Would not European Union been more appropriate? It would not arise so much controversies. This view has many advocates also in the West. Membership in EU would automatically lead to NATO without great trouble and rising suspicion of Russia. If NATO persists on moving closer Russia’s borders such manoeuvre would be regarded as hostile, seen as continuation, though by inertia, of a policy aimed at containment of Russia. It seems that Russia cannot reconcile itself with the new situation where it has little influence. Therefore they raise proposals of new security organizations. One of the Russian ideas is strengthening of the OSCE.

It seems more and more likely that Russia will be forced to accept the principle on which all countries of OSCE have agreed: each country has right to join any security organizations according to their own interests.

Baltic states on NATO and Russian relations

Foreign policy of Baltic states can be regarded as an attempt to escape Russian hegemony. As far as neutrality was concerned, the unhappy experience of late 1930s and the 1940s played an important role in the demise of that concept. Therefore such an active position towards NATO and other Western organizations. They want Western involvement to counterbalance the Russian influence determined by geography and the historical legacy. Unfortunately, it seems that Baltic states occupy higher priority in the foreign and security policies of Russia than in those of the major Western powers.

Baltic states also with suspicion watch development of relations between Russia and NATO in order not to permit another deal which would divide East Europe in spheres of influence. Russia consistently uses the concept of spheres of influence. It wants to control the states of the former Soviet Union. That prompts Baltic states to hasten the process of their integration in Western security structures.

Recent developments and future scenarios

Now it is almost clear that Baltic states will not be among those states which will be accepted in the first round of NATO enlargement. That has served as a ground for different statements both in Baltic States and West. Latvian Foreign Minister assured that Latvia would further strive for NATO membership. Several Western politicians have said that after the first round the door to NATO will stay open.

One of the positive events in last months has been the visit of Lebed to Brussels. That allowed to continue the dialogue between Russia and NATO. Secretary general Solana admitted: “We do want democratic Russia, we want a Russia which is not isolated. We have basically three plans which we are working on. First: adaptation of NATO. Second: opening of NATO. Third: NATO-Russia relations. We have to do it in convergent manner.” (Press conference, 7/10-1996) No doubt, Russia will express its discontent with erosion of neutral European security belt between the West and Russia and it will do everything to slow down the process of NATO enlargement but Russia will never get right to veto.

Literature:

Barner-Barry, Carol & Hody, Cynthia (1995) “The Soviet Successor

Countries and the New World Order” from “The politics of

change”, NY, St.Martins Press

Carpenter, Ted Galen (1994) “Beyond NATO. Staying Out of Europe’s

Wars”, Cato Institute

Baranovsky, V (1992) “Back to Europe? The Old Continent and the New

Policy in Moscow” from “In from the Cold” ed. By

V.Baranovsky and H.-J.Spanger

Furman, Dmitry (1995) “Russia’s Foreign-Policy Reference-Points” from Svobodnaya Misl No.8, pp.3-17

Kaiser, Karl (1996) “Reforming NATO” from Foreign Policy

Kozirev, Andrei (1995) “Partnership or Cold Peace?” from Foreign Policy

Nr.99 Summer 1995,pp.3-14

Lukin, Vladimir (1992) “Our Security Predicament” from Foreign Policy

Nr.88

Shearman, Peter (1995) “Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990”,

Westview Press

Zhyryari, Olga “The Baltic Countries and Russia (1990-1993): Doomed to

Good-Neighborliness?”