Russian National Interests in a Changing World

Irita Kise

Developments in Russia have been in the focus of attention for the last decade, especially because Russia was regarded as the hair of the former Soviet Union. Many observers admit that Russia itself has taken the role which was played by the USSR, at least, recent developments show that Russia has intention to re-establish itself as a great power. Russian leaders have often repeated that Russia has been a great power and it will remain a great power in future.

In these ten years, since the beginning of the changes in the Soviet Union which led to the end of the Cold War and bipolarity in the world, the feelings in the West towards Russia have dramatically changed. In the beginning there was euphoria about the declared democratisation, later it transformed into support of the Yeltsin reforms to guarantee their continuity. In last couple of years Western authors and politicians have lost their optimism facing the new developments in Russia and its foreign policy. That disillusionment is clearly visible in the headings of the articles on this theme - “A Tired Anarchy”, “Revival of Imperial Policy”, “A Different Dance”, “West Must Abandon a Fantasy View of Russia”, “Russia Takes a Harder Line on West”, etc. Everybody, also Russian commentators, has noticed the gradual change: hardening of position and growing emphasis on military force. The best evidence for that is the new military doctrine which has come as a response to the diminished role of the military in last years. In Gorbachev era began the process of conversation, civilians began to play greater role in national security analysis which in the past was dominated by the militaries. The new doctrine shows that military aspect is once again re-gaining its role as one of the most important aspects in the life of the country. National security of Russia is now more and more viewed in terms of military security and use of armed forces is one of the means to achieve goals which are of vital importance to the state. James H. Slagle points to some differences from the previous military doctrine:

- It reverts from a defensive position to an offensive “pre-emptive strike” capability;

- It reverts from a position of no nuclear use to a position that envisions the possible escalatory use of nuclear weapons;

- It places increased emphasis on strategic non-nuclear deterrent forces;

- It places new emphasis on the need for military technology advancements;

- It draws a line at any retaliation taken against any of the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the states of the former Soviet Union. (1994)

Reasons for such change in position can be explained with both internal and external factors. Russia has recovered itself from the chock of collapse of the Soviet Union and begun to seek for its place in the international system. It perceives the new international environment as threatening. Moreover Russia itself acts as having identified itself with one of the imperial states in the past - Russian Empire or Soviet Union. In both cases geopolitical interests, military force, image of enemy played important role. It is very likely that Russia could not create an absolutely new democratic peace-loving identity and therefore it had to revert to one of the old identities. Now it seems that the old image of the Russian Empire gradually becomes recognised as the most proper one because Russia now lacks that ideological factor that was the driving force in the former Soviet Union. Here the main role is played by the domestic forces. Internal struggle for power has raised the question of Russian nationalism and idea of great Russia comes with it. Unfortunately that country has known only one kind of greatness and that is territorial expansion. In this essay I will try to prove that Russia’s interests have not changed for centuries and as in the 18th century it wants to defend state border through the territorial expansion.

Russian scientists and politicians also try to explain the new position of Russia. It is interesting to know the opinion from inside. Alexei Arbatov sees that as natural response of the military and many politicians to the changes in international society which have occurred with such speed and in such scale creating new state of affairs. That caused great concerns among the Russian elites, even beside radical nationalists.(Arbatov,1995:136) The militaries who always have perceived the world in military-strategic terms, may feel threatened in this new situation:

- The East - West balance of conventional forces has shifted for Moscow from nearly three-fold superiority to an almost three-fold inferiority;

- Moscow’s present military power has been drawn back one and a half thousand kilometres from the centre of Europe;(Arbatov, 1995:135)

- Two layers of buffer zone are no more reliable: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union states have now “head of their own” and can enter alliances as they wish.

Even Russian population sees the military as the only guarantor of Russia’s territorial integrity and the security of 25 million Russians living in “near abroad”. Such reliance on military is understandable in the society which experiences economic crisis and political turmoil. Order is often associated with peaceful life, welfare and its symbol - army, due to the militarised past of the society. There is no doubt that ordinary citizens do not feel any fear of Russia being invaded by any other country. They rely on army. Society at large seems to hold that no war or serious external danger can threaten a country protected by nuclear arms. (Zubok, 1995) Thus imperial dreams of new Russia cannot be rooted in need for physical survival with exception if some political force consciously exaggerates the threat and makes society to believe in immense danger from outside world. Maybe there are the remains of the old socialist time thinking when Soviet Union perceived it as a duty to interfere in the affairs of other countries. Sometimes the interference was guided by economic, sometimes by strategic or ideological concerns. Therefore public opinion is not particularly sensitive to violation of the rule of non-interference - the well-known principle of the system of United Nations. Very seldom society has been concerned with matters of foreign policy. It has to worry about other things, such as economic performance of the country, crime, etc. In foreign affairs elites have had quite free hands to act. Russia is especially famous with its manipulation with public opinion. The soviet tradition of the state monopoly on information is too good to throw away.

There are several elites in Russia which have their own foreign policies. Ministry of Defence, President and his staff, parliament and its fractions, and, of course, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even some of the regions try to build relations with neighbouring countries independently from central government. Leaders of some parties also want to help the country with its foreign relations, the most eager one is Zhirinovski with his journeys to Iraq and similar places in the world. Thus, the characteristic feature of Russian foreign policy is disorganisation that does not help the world to understand what Russia really wants and is intended to do. Until this chaos remains there will be no certainty. Very much will depend on who will get the power and on this party’s relations with army. The military until very recently has been the most powerful force in Russia with resources and means of influence. It is not likely that it will be ready to give away this privileged position. Military elite has remained on the scene since the Soviet times and want to maintain the leading role. It is obvious that military people are the ones who have not adopted the new thinking. They do not have the need for reforms and liberalisation. Especially painful they feel the changes in relations with the West. Y.Borisova, the journalist, reported about one military conference in St. Petersburg:

“ Officer spent about an hour on the colonisation of Russia by the West, the selling out treason of the working people by Russia’s current rulers, and the united front now coalescing around Russia’s borders. German imperialism ... the revival of the neo-fascist German state ... USA and NATO in Europe are laying the ground for the further ruin of Russia ... The Turkish fleet is gaining superiority in the Black Sea... the Japanese are launching rockets into space.

What a lot of enemies are all around, I thought, shivering.”(1996)

Russia can become a hostage of its own army if it will not learn to control it. I do not think that the military pretend when they identify Russia’s enemies. It is their real view on the situation in the world. Accordingly, the national interests in their opinion would look like this: defending state border from numerous enemies; for that the rebuilding of military industry is necessary; in order to secure the borders, re-integration of the former Soviet Union is preferable. Unfortunately, this perception of national interests does not completely coincide with that of society and other elites. However, the recent developments show that the military aspect is gaining more and more influence in foreign policy of Russia. The situation in Chechen Republic is, of course, the internal matter of Russia but it clearly demonstrates in what language government speaks in its own country which cannot leave outside world indifferent.

As public opinion has little influence in agenda setting of the government, at least in foreign policy field, the real society’s interests are unnoticed. I suppose that people in the country which undergoes a serious economic crisis are not concerned with fighting some imagined enemy at the same time when they must do all to survive. In population’s interests is rapid economic growth that is achievable only in co-operation with the rest of the world. Suspicion and hostility are not compatible with successful co-operation. Unfortunately, the situation now can be described exactly with the same words - suspicion and hostility. As B.Whitemore writes: “Russia’s honeymoon with the West is over.” (1996) It ended even earlier regarding the “near abroad”. It now seems that re-integration of the former USSR is inevitable. Russia has never regarded former republics of USSR as fully independent states. Of course, it is hard to forget all the soviet history and get used to think of new states as sovereign ones just as much as Russia itself. I think that most dangerous is Russia’s action in near abroad which affirms - the old soviet thinking is alive. That is clearly evident in the behaviour of the military. Obviously, many of the actions performed in near abroad by militaries were sanctioned and planned in Russian government but some of them were army’s own initiative. It is not quite clear how much in actions in Moldova, Georgia and other places was government’s acceptance and how much pressure of the military elite. It would be unfavourable in both cases. If the former means that Russian government uses age-old tactics to get influence in neighbouring countries, the latter proves that the military is still dominating the state. Anyway, not depending on who has given the orders, Russia has installed easy manipulated regimes in almost all border countries which seem to have any importance in Russian security model. In eyes of West Russia wants to look like responsible, liberal-democratic state but its politics abroad resembles the old imperial traditions. States of CIS are regarded as Russia’s possession and there is no need to hide old habits. This double standard seems very dangerous. The lower status of CIS is illustrated by the fact that Ministry of Foreign Affairs has there little influence. Instead, the main role is played by other groups which are less West-oriented and first of all those are military units.

A great deal of Russia’s hardened foreign policy thus can be explained by domestic developments which emphasise the strengthening of the military. Another part of the explanation lies in Russia’s perception of international situation and threats it causes. D.Furman describes Russian agitation as willingness to be “great” but also doubts if others perceive Russia as great power. (1995:6) This nervousness allows to compare Russia with behaviour of a little child who wants that adults pay greater attention to him and listen to what he wants. In order to get heard he can do rather stupid things. D.Furman asks why Russia could not be like China. That big country does not strive to be present in all meetings of importance, to offer its assistance in every conflict on earth. Russia’s behaviour is so contrasting to that of China.

One of the old soviet traditions which in Russia seems to be preserved is the need for an enemy. In the past the enemy was clear - USA and its allies. Now the life without an enemy has lost much of its sense. Here and there emerge ideas of threat from outside: Turkey, China, NATO. No one seems to think of these threats as real but the same idea of threats is the one that counts. With that idea elites can justify its actions and mobilise support. Perception of threats is present in Russia. Where is suspicion can easily be also misperception and relations in the world which seemed so promising would roll back in confrontation.

D.Furman suggests three possible directions of the restoring the former image of great power:

1) territorial expansion (Zhirinovsky’s idea - Russia from Baltic Sea to the Indian ocean);

2) Russia surrounded by allies (in fact, it can be the same territorial expansion);

3) economic development and stable political system leading to influence in the world.(1995:7-9)

The first two developments are rather archaic, only some Third World countries still think in terms of territorial expansion as leading to grater role in international society. Nevertheless, Russia’s trend towards the great power status can be understood - it has recently lost that status and cannot reconcile itself with the new situation. NATO, G-7 are like aristocratic clubs in which there is no place for Russia.

Many different foreign policies prove that Russia has not yet found its identity and has serious doubts about its place in the world system. First of all Russia needs to determine its national and security interests. A promising sign is the changing meaning of the term “security”:

- from conception of “balance of power” to conception about “balance of interests”;

- from confronting ideologies and security structures to international co-operation;

- from principle of territorial defence to principle of security of individual and personality. (Rubanov, 1995:3)

Even if these changes are not implemented in legislation society has understood that in the modern world the old meaning of security is in past. Russian security concept has not been completely worked out, there are many contradictions in it. One thing is clear for Russia - it must preserve its statehood. Rubanov thinks that Russia has good prospects in future due to its great potential of resources, culture, science, population.(1995:3) Government works to create all-embracing concept of security and legislation in different fields of security: economic, military, information, health, etc. Unfortunately, Russia is not as predictable as majority of West European states. Too much depends on party in power. Military doctrine can be changed over night if some new political forces gain influence. I must recognise that all Russian history has followed one line - territorial expansionism and imperialism. The facts are obvious and I can see no objections to assume that this historical trend would continue. Russia’s interests always are the same, in all times and all regimes. It wants to preserve its territorial integrity and increase its influence in the world. I can hardly imagine that Russia one day would behave as normal country. Its huge territory and human resources determine Russia’s behaviour as superpower. Besides, there are many political groups which still think in old imperial terms. The only solution would be Russia’s democratisation and new identity distant from that of former USSR and Russian Empire. Then the rest of the world could feel safe. The process of re-socialisation can take several generations. It is hard to expect tolerance from people who now lead the country, teach in the schools because all their life has been influenced by totalitarian regime. The process of democratisation must be guided from above as it was done in Germany after the second world war. For this job democratic government is required.

Right now, when situation in Russian domestic arena is uncertain, it is useful to examine all possible directions of Russia’s foreign and security policy. Two dimensions can be distinguished in ongoing discussion:

1) geopolitical - Europe or Asia;

2) active or passive foreign policy.

The question whether Russia is eastward-looking or westward-looking is an age-old question. Atlantists vs. Eurasianists. Each has its arguments. Atlantists remind about tsarist Russia’s presence in European affairs. Peter the Great was opening the “window to Europe”. Soviet Union was also strongly oriented towards Europe. Later came “common European home” of Gorbachev. Atlantists realise the importance of the integration with western economic system. That is seen as only remedy for Russia’s collapsing economy. Europe is also regarded as one of the political centres of the world and presence and influence there is a question of self-confidence as status in world society.

Eurasianists argue that Russia has never been a part of Europe in the cultural sense and will never be. They speak about an inevitable conflict between Russia and Western civilisations. S.Huntington also predicts clash of civilisations one of which is Slavic civilisation. Eurasianists want Russia to change orientation more towards east and “second echelon states” like Mexico, Greece. The highest priority must be relations with near abroad. This pattern is gradually becoming a reality without abandoning the direction towards Europe. Peace-keeping in CIS and “Slavic brothers” in Serbia can serve as evidence.

Active or passive foreign policy involves the response to the new geopolitic situation. Passive policy would mean that Russia’s greatest concerns would be the domestic ones, especially the economic reconstruction. It would not interfere in domestic affairs of neighbouring countries in order to guarantee its security but take reasonable measures to defend its border. Actually, this pattern of development sounds to me the most favourable one but at the same time it is rather unrealistic. More likely Russia is going to keep its present activist foreign policy:

- gaining influence in near abroad trough various means;

- looking for recognition of its great power status in the world.

These both tendencies are caused by fear. Last two years fear has dominated Russian military and political elites. It is fear from isolation, fear of loss, disintegration, everything. Most of all it is fear of loosing status. If the Russian government would follow the way of democratisation these fears would bother it less. The soviet heritage has turned out to be a lasting one. To additional factors have contributed to Russia’s insecurity: 1) no time to digest the implications of the collapse of the USSR;

2) the removal of ideology from security policy;

3) demoralising perception that Russia has lost the Cold war. (Covington, 1995) Moscow believes that this superpower status, built on military strength and geopolitic situation in Eurasia, will end the West’s dictate over its security policy and firmly place Russia again in a world leadership position. As there is no real chance that Russia would soon become member of “aristocratic clubs” of West it tries to achieve its goal in other ways - through building parallel security system in Europe. Russia wants to turn OSCE into a cornerstone of the “new European structure”. Russia has been one of the founders of the OSCE and that would increase its political weight much more than would the persistent quest for second-class membership of the first-class Western club. (Baranovsky, 1992:116) Russia wants to be a leader in this new security system and not a subordinated to others. In this case is understandable Russia’s desire to include in OSCE NATO as policing force in Europe. Then NATO would be controlled also by Russia not only USA. Unfortunately, Russia has failed to create security structures which would satisfy it as set free from fears of isolation.

The first wave of co-operation is in past and new era of competition is approaching. This time in geopolitical not ideological terms. It seems quite impossible to find a balance between allowing Russia to act like imperial country and constraining it without provoking serious conflict.

Bibliography:

Furman, Dmitry (1995) “Russia’s Foreign-Policy Reference-Points” from Svobodnaya Misl No.8, pp.3-17

Whitmore, Brian (1996) “West Must Abandon Fantasy View of Russia” from St Petersburg Press No.143

Borisova, Yevgenia (1996) “Cold War Warriors Looking for Enemies Pick on Russia’s Mothers” from Petersburg Press No.147

Rubanov, Vladimir (1995) “Russia: Its Security and Its Future” from Svobodnaya Misl No.10, pp.3-11

Slagle, James (1994) “New Russian Military Doctrine: Sign of the Times” from Parameters Vol.XXIV No.1

Covington, Stephen (1995) “Moscow’s Insecurity and Eurasian Instability” from European Security Vol.4, No.3

Baranovsky, V (1992) “Back to Europe? The Old Continent and the New Policy in Moscow” from “In from the Cold” ed. By V.Baranovsky and H.-J.Spanger